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Abstract This paper describes the design and implementation of a
static analysis tool for certifying Java Card applications, according to
security rules defined by the smart card industry. Java Card is a dialect
of Java designed for programming multi-application smart cards and the
tool, called SawjaCard, has been specialised for the particular Java Card
programming patterns. The tool is built around a static analysis engine
which uses a combination of numeric and heap analysis. It includes a
model of the Java Card libraries and the Java Card firewall. The tool
has been evaluated on a series of industrial applets and is shown to au-
tomate a substantial part of the validation process.
1 Introduction
Security plays a prominent role in the smart card industry, due to their exten-
sive use in banking and telecommunication. Hence, certification of smart cards
has become accepted industrial practice. Traditional certifications (e.g., against
the Common Criteria [1]) focus primarily on the protection mechanisms of the
card’s hardware and operating system. More recently, attention has been drawn
to the increasing number of applications that execute on the cards and the smart
card industry has elaborated a set of secure coding guidelines [20,12] that apply
to basic applications. Basic applications are granted limited privileges and the
goal of the guidelines is to ensure that they do not interfere with more sensitive
(e.g., banking) applications. The verification of these guidelines is done by an
independent authority that analyses the code and issues a certificate of confor-
mance (or pinpoints failures of compliance). In collaboration with a company
from the smart card industry we have developed the static analysis tool Saw-
jaCard that can significantly simplify and automate the validation of smart card
basic applications.
We consider applications written in the Java Card language – a dialect of
Java dedicated to smart cards. To be validated, an application must respect a se-
ries of secure coding rules. SawjaCard is designed for the certification procedure
proposed by AFSCM, the French industry association for Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC) technology providers, which consists of around 65 rules in total.
These rules impose requirements on how an application is programmed, how it
uses the resources of the card, and what kind of exceptions are acceptable.
Our main contribution is the implementation of the first static analysis tool
able to automate the validation of basic applications according to AFSCM rules.
Our experiments show that SawjaCard proves automatically 87% of the proper-
ties. This work also demonstrates that precise but informal security guidelines
can be mapped to formal properties that can be checked by harvesting a static
analysis result. The design of the static analysis engine is a contribution of its
own: we exploit the characteristics of Java Card but also constraints imposed
by guidelines to get a precise yet efficient analyser. In terms of static analysis,
the main contribution is a novel abstract domain for identifying a variant of the
object-oriented singleton object pattern, where the nullity of a field is used to
control the execution of an allocation instruction (Section 4.2).
We first present Java Card, highlighting the features relevant for security val-
idation such as the Java Card firewall. The security requirements are described,
and we explain how they can be verified on the model obtained through static
analysis. We then present the main features of the analysis engine that is at the
core of the tool. This includes the above-mentioned domain for detecting single-
ton objects and the use of trace partitioning for identifying file accesses. The tool
has been evaluated against a series of industrial applications. We explain how
the tool has significantly improved the certification procedure by automating a
large part of the code verification.
2 Java Card
Java Card is a software development framework dedicated to multi-application
smart cards. It includes a reduced version of Java, and has its own binary code
format dedicated to devices with limited memory and processing capabilities.
Like in Java, a Java Card application or library is written as a set of packages
containing classes. After a standard Java compilation, Java Card converts all the
classes belonging to the same package into a so-called CAP file. The CAP file
is optimised to be small and meet smart card constraints, e.g., fields, methods
and classes are referred via token integers in order to reduce the size of the file.
Java Card keeps the class-based object oriented model of Java. Class inheri-
tance, interfaces and the resolution mechanism for virtual and static calls is the
same as in Java. Primitive types are restricted to the Java boolean, byte, short
and optionally integer (might not be supported by every platform and the use
of integer is also forbidden in some security guidelines). Arrays are limited to
single-dimensional arrays. Strings are not available, neither as a primitive type,
nor as a provided library class. Garbage collection is not required by the Java
Card specification and it is still common not to have a garbage collector in a
smart card. As memory is precious, application are expected to allocate data
only during their installation phase and as parsimoniously as possible. Security
guidelines emphasise this aspect (e.g., allocation in a loop is forbidden).
The bytecode language is close to the Java bytecode language but with some
noticeable differences. It is still a stack-based language with basically a reduced
instruction set. However there are some differences which makes the Java Card
bytecode more than a strict subset. For example, the operand stack contains 16
bits values and the standard operations work on such short values. Hence, each
arithmetical operation is semantically different from its Java counterpart.
2.1 Modelling the Java Card runtime and its libraries
Our static analysis tool performs a whole program analysis. It takes a single
application CAP file but also expects additional CAP files representing all the
used libraries. The core Java Card libraries are usually not available for analysis.
They are i) proprietary; ii) card dependent; iii) and (partly) implemented using
native code. To get a portable and card independent whole program, we have
implemented the core Java Card libraries and standard extensions such as Glob-
alPlatform or ETSI standard UICC [10] using pure Java Card code extended
by specification methods that are built-ins of the analyser: RANDOM, ASSUME and
ASSERT. As we are not interested in proving functional correctness but security
properties, the model of a method is usually simple and is based on the informal
specification of the libraries. The model initialises system resources of the Java
Card runtime. For instance, it allocates singleton exceptions objects that are
owned by the Java Card runtime or global system input/output buffers. The
model is also responsible for simulating the different phases of the applet life cy-
cle. The install phase consists in initialising the applet state. The applet is also
assigned its Application IDentifier (AID) and is registered within the Java Card
runtime. The process phase is an infinite event loop where the applet processes
commands. Eventually, the applet enters the uninstall phase where it is removed
from the card.
2.2 Modelling the Java Card firewall
The Java Card security architecture relies on a firewall which strongly limits
inter-applet communication. The firewall mechanism guarantees that an inter-
applet communication triggers a dynamic run-time check whose success depends
on the owner of the object and the running context of the code. Every created
object is assigned an owner, which is the context of the applet performing the
object allocation. Each method is assigned the context of its enclosing applet. At
runtime, the virtual machine ensures that an applet can only manipulate objects
in its context and raises a SecurityException otherwise.
Communication between applets is achieved through Shareable interfaces.
Using a specific method of the runtime, an applet A receives a shareable request
from an explicitly identified applet B. The applet A can accept the request
depending on the identity of B and return an object o implementing a Shareable
interface. When applet B calls a method of object o, a context switch occurs and
the method runs with the context of A.
Our Java model makes explicit the security checks performed by the Fire-
wall using built-in API calls to obtain the owner of objects GET_OWNER or the
running contexts GET_CALLER_CONTEXT (see Fig. 1). The owner/context properties
are directly modelled by the abstract domains: each abstract object in the heap
is assigned a owner and the abstract call stack is tagged by running contexts.
1 /* @API javacard.framework.AID: "Throws: SecurityException
2 * - if anObject object is not accessible in the caller's context" */
3 public final boolean equals(Object anObject){
4 short caller_ctx = GET_CALLER_CONTEXT();
5 if(!JCRESystem.accessible_in_caller_context(anObject, caller_ctx))
6 throw JCRESystem.securityException;
7 if (anObject==null || !(anObject instanceof AID)) return false;
8 return [...] }
Figure 1: Example of API performing a Firewall check
This precise modelling of the Firewall is necessary to rule out security exceptions.
Needless to say that the validation of applets strictly forbids security exceptions.
3 Validation of Java Card applications
The validation of Java Card applications is based on several sets of coding guide-
lines, edited by industrial stakeholders. The main source of guidelines comes from
the AFSCM [20], a French association of companies working in the area of NFC
and contact-less smart cards. The AFSCM guidelines consists of 65 coding rules
that specify properties that an applet must obey in order to be validated. Rules
from the Global Platform [12] initiative have also been integrated. Some rules
(such as ”The interactions between different interfaces must be clearly defined.”)
are not amenable to automatic verification. Others are not considered because
they concern the Java source (”A switch statement must always include a de-
fault case.”). Eliminating duplicates, we extracted 55 verifiable rules from the
guidelines mentioned above, and classified them as shown in Fig. 2.
The rules vary significantly in granularity and type of property. Some prop-
erties are purely syntactic (“An application must not contain a nop instruction”,
or “An application shall not use an AID already registered.”) whereas others
require information about the dynamic behaviour of the application (“no null
pointer exceptions” or “no array-out-of bounds exceptions”). Some rules specify
Type Number Examples
syntactical 20 Strictly forbidden methods, no Nop, package name checking
constant values 6 Constant array size, Proactive commands and events
call graph 6 Allocation only in specific part of the code.
exceptions 10 Ensure that various exceptions will never occur
file system 4 Report read or written files, ensure deletion of created file.
termination 1 No recursive code.
other 8 Applet instance should not be placed in static field.
total 55
Figure 2: Classification of the rules (from AFSCM [20] and Global Platform [12]).
restrictions on how library methods can be called, and with what arguments.
Most of these rules cannot be verified as is, exactly due to the undecidability of
the underlying semantic property, and approximations are called for. As men-
tioned above, an important feature of these rules is that certain rules simplify the
verification of others. E.g., knowing that the rules “Recursive code is forbidden”
and “Arrays must be allocated with a determined size” are satisfied means that
the analyser can strive for more precision without running into certain complex-
ity and computability issues. In the following, we explain how the validation of
the rules can be done by mining the static analysis result.
Numeric values: In Java Card, resources are often accessed using integer
identifiers and managed by calling methods with a fixed set of flags. Many rules
specify that those integers must be constant or range over a set of legitimate
values. Our analyser is computing an abstraction of numeric values and therefore
of method arguments. The abstraction of the method arguments is checked for
compliance with the rules.
Array values: Some resources can be coded by arrays of integers. For in-
stance, files are identified by an array [i1;...;in] which represents the file
name i1/.../in. Menu entries (i.e., strings) are coded by arrays of bytes.
As with numeric values, validation rules often require those arrays to be con-
stant. Files are an exception. File names are constructed by a sequence of calls
fh.select(d1) . . . fh.select(dn) where fh is a FileView object and the di
are typically constants, identifying directories. Our analyser does not track se-
quences of events but our model of the class FileView is an array representing
the current working directory that is updated by calls to the select method.
Our analyser models arrays and provides for each index a numeric abstraction of
the content. This abstraction is queried in order to validate rules about resources
encoded as arrays.
Control-flow: The validation rules impose constraints on the control-flow
graph of the application—especially during the installation phase. For instance,
most memory allocations are required only to take place during the install phase,
identified by a call to the install method. The analysis is constructing an ab-
stract control-flow graph corresponding to the inlined control-flow graph of the
application. Constraints over the control-flow graph can therefore be checked by
exploring the abstract control-flow graph. For the particular case of memory al-
location, we traverse the graph and make sure that memory allocation primitives
e.g., new statement, are only accessible from the install method.
Exceptional behaviour: Validation rules are strict about exception han-
dling. Run-time exceptions such as ArrayOutOfBounds, NullPointerException
and ClassCastException are strictly forbidden. In our bytecode intermediate
representation, run-time exceptions correspond to explicit instructions and we
generate verification conditions for all those instructions. For obvious reasons,
security exceptions (SecurityException) are also forbidden. The abstraction of
the heap is designed to model object ownership and can be used to ensure that
the security checks performed by the Java Card Firewall do no raise Securi-
tyException. There are other rules about exceptional behaviours which can be
interpreted as coding guidelines. The analysis is precisely modelling the flow of
exceptions. In particular, it collects for each handler the caught exception and
for each method call the escaping exceptions. This information is sufficient for
checking all the rules regarding exceptions.
4 Overview of the static analysis engine
Our static analysis engine is designed specifically for Java Card and its partic-
ular programming style. Existing general purpose analysis frameworks for Java
e.g., [32,19,17] cannot be applied directly to Java Card. Firstly, existing frame-
works do not provide a CAP front-end – this is a non-negligible engineering issue.
Although CAP files are compiled from class files, the inverse transformation is far
from obvious. For instance, the instruction set is different and dynamic method
lookup is compiled using explicit virtual tables. Secondly, our static analysis
engine exploits fully the fact that Java Card programs are relatively small, for-
bid recursion and allocate few objects. Standard Java analyses designed to scale
for object-oriented programs cannot exploit this. Finally, the Java Card firewall
which has no Java counterpart is also modelled directly at the analysis level.
Our analyser operates on a 3-address code intermediate bytecode represen-
tation A3Bir [7] that is obtained by pre-processing the binary CAP file. This
representation is adapted from the Sawja framework [17] and has the advan-
tage of making explicit the different runtime checks performed by the Java Card
Virtual Machine. An example of such intermediate code is given Fig. 4.
The static analysis engine implements an inter-procedural scheme which
consists in a dynamic inlining of method calls. The benefit is a precise inter-
procedural scheme that mimics the behaviour of a concrete interpreter. In terms
of abstract domains, the domain of the inter-procedural analysis is D∗ given
that D is the domain for the intra-procedural analysis. This approach is effec-
tive for two reasons that are specific to Java Card: recursion is forbidden and
the programs are relatively small.
4.1 Combining intervals, constant sets and symbolic equalities
To abstract numeric values, the analyser is using a combination of three abstract
domains: intervals, finite sets and symbolic equalities. The code snippet of Fig 3
illustrates their collaboration. The abstract domain of intervals Int is very popu-
lar but is not precise enough if used alone. At Line 4 of Fig. 3, the interval [0;5] is
used to abstract the non-consecutive values 0 and 5. As many Java Card meth-
ods take as arguments integer flags or return integer flags that are in general not
consecutive, this is a common source of imprecision. To deal with this issue, we
use a domain Fin = P(Cst) ∪ {⊤} where Cst is the set of constants that appear
in the program text. For efficiency, information about these constants is lost
after arithmetic operations and reductions with the interval domain are limited
to the cases of ⊥ and singletons i.e., abstract elements with represent a single
concrete value. For Line 4, the product Int × Fin gives a precise invariant but
1 byte i = 0; /*i:[0;0] & {0}*/
2 if(RANDOM_BOOL()){
3 i = 5; /*i:[5;5] & {5}*/
4 } /*i:[0;5] & {0;5} */
5 byte j = i; /*i:[0;5] & {0,5} j:[0;5] & {0,5} with j == i */
6 i = (j==0) ? (byte)(i+5) : i; /*i:[5;5] & {5} j:[0;5] & {0,5} */
Figure 3: Collaboration between numeric abstract domains
would still be unable to infer that at Line 6 the value of i can only be 5. To get
this result, it is necessary to propagate through the test j==0 the knowledge that
j equals i. This is a known weakness of non-relational domains which compute
an abstraction for each variable independently. There are well-known numeric
relational domains e.g., convex polyhedra [6], octagons [24]. These domains are
very expressive but are also computationally costly. Our analyser is using a more
cost-effective weakly relational domain [25] computing for each program point
and each local variable x an equality x = e where e is a side-effect free expression
of our intermediate representation i.e., an expression built upon variables, arith-
metic operators and field accesses. At Line 5, we have the equality j==i. Hence,
when j==0, i is also 0 and when j != 0, j have value 5 and so has i. Combined,
the three domains are able to compute the precise invariant of Line 6.
Symbolic expressions improve the precision of numeric abstractions but also
significantly contribute to ruling out spurious null pointers. This is illustrated
by Fig. 4. Our goal is to verify that bar is called with a non-null argument. At
source level, this property is obvious. However, the cumulative effect of Java com-
pilation, CAP conversion and the re-construction of our analyser intermediate
representation introduces temporary variables. Without symbolic expressions,
at Line 3, we only know that the temporary variable t0 is not null but this vari-
able is not used anymore. Symbolic expressions keep track of equalities between
variables t0, t1, t2, the constant null and the value of field this.foo. Using
the theory of equality, we can deduce at Line 2 that this.foo is not null. This
information is propagated at Line 4 where we deduce that t2 is also not null.




1 t0=this.foo; t1=null; if (t0==t1) goto 5;
2 /* t0==this.foo & t1==null */
3 t2=this.foo; checknotnull (this!=null);
4 /* t0==this.foo & t1==null & t2==this.foo */
5 this.bar(t2); return;
Figure 4: Left: Source code Right: A3Bir representation
4.2 Points-to analysis with detection of singleton objects
Our heap abstraction is flow-sensitive and takes the form of a points-to graph [15].
A node in the graph is an abstract object identified by a call-stack and the cre-
ation point of the new statement, or a special node representing the null value.
Object creation is done with parsimony in Java Card, and most new statements
only ever allocate one object. In other words, most abstract objects are single-
tons representing a single concrete object. If an abstract object is a singleton,
the analyser can precisely model side effects and perform strong updates.
Abstract counting of the number of allocations of an abstract object o ∈ AO
is a standard technique for identifying singletons objects. The properties ”not
allocated”, ”allocated at most once” and ”allocated many times” are encoded by
the numeric domain {0, 1,∞}. Our domain is therefore Cnt = AO → {0, 1,∞}.
In Java Card most objects are allocated during the install phase. This phase is
loop-free and abstract counting therefore precisely identifies singleton objects.
However, abstract counting fails at identifying singleton objects that are allo-
cated during the process command loop.
To improve precision we propose a novel abstract domain able to capture
variants of the so-called object-oriented singleton pattern. The idea behind the
singleton pattern is that a field fd is either i) null and the singleton object
is not allocated or ii) not null and the singleton object is allocated. To cap-
ture such conditional invariants, our singleton domain maps each field to a val-
uation of the abstract allocation counters. The abstract domain is therefore
Sgton = Field → Cnt . Consider sgton ∈ Sgton and a field fd . The intuition is
that sgton(fd) only provides information about abstract counters under the con-
dition that the field fd is null. When the points-to ensures that a field fd is
definitely not null, the condition does not holds and sgton(fd) can be set arbi-
trarily, in particular it can be strengthened to ⊥. When the points-to ensures
that a field fd is definitely null, the condition holds and sgton(fd) can be used
to strengthen the current abstract counters. If the condition cannot be decided,
the information sgton(fd) remains dormant but becomes useful after e.g., a test
fd = null or would be updated after an assignment to the field fd .
Formally, given a concretisation γCnt : Cnt → P(Heap) for the Cnt domain,
the concretisation γ : Sgton→ P(Heap) is defined by:
h ∈ γ(sgton) iff
∧
fd
h(fd) = null ⇒ h ∈ γCnt(sgton(fd)).
Fig. 5 illustrates how the reduced product [4] of a points-to, Sgton and Cnt
analyses can ensure the singleton property. Before the loop (Line 1), the object
o is not allocated, the field fd is definitely null and the conditional property
(fd = null⇒ (o 7→ 0)) holds. At the head of the loop (Line 4), the object o is
a singleton, the field fd is either null or points to the object o. The singleton
domain holds the key invariant: the object o is not allocated when the field fd
is null. After the test fd == null (Line 6), we refine our points-to and conclude
that fd is definitely null. Therefore, the conditional property of the singleton
domain holds: we can exploit the right hand side of the condition and refine the
1 /* fd = null & (fd = null⇒ (o 7→ 0)) & o 7→ 0 */
2 [...]
3 while(true){
4 /* fd ∈ {null, o} & (fd = null⇒ (o 7→ 0)) & o 7→ 1 */
5 if (fd == null)
6 /* fd = null & (fd = null⇒ (o 7→ 0)) & o 7→ 0 */
7 fd = new o();
8 /* fd = o & (fd = null⇒ ⊥) & o 7→ 1 */ }
Figure 5: Singleton pattern
abstract counter (o 7→ 0⊓ o 7→ 1 = o 7→ 0) and conclude that the object o is not
allocated. After the allocation of o (Line 8), the object o is a singleton (o 7→ 1)
and fd points to o. Hence, fd is definitely not null. This is where the conditional
singleton domain becomes useful. Because the condition fd = null now no longer
applies, the abstract counters can be strengthened to ⊥. For simplicity, say that
the abstract state after the (empty) else branch is the abstract state of the loop
head of Line 4. At the end of the conditional, after the join, we get the same
abstract state as at the loop head, which is therefore a fixpoint.
In practice, our Sgton domain also maintains conditions over instance fields
and numeric fields (false plays the role of null). For our Java Card applications,
those enhancements allow a precise identification of all singleton objects.
5 File system access: a case for trace partitioning
Trace partitioning [27] is a generic technique for locally improving the precision
of a static analysis. It consists in partitioning an abstract state depending on
a history of events. Suppose that the original abstract state is D♯, after trace
partitioning, the abstract state is (Event∗ ×D♯)∗ where Event is an arbitrary set
of syntactic events (e.g., a call to a specific method) or semantic events (e.g., the
variable x has value v). We have successfully used trace partitioning for precisely
determining the files accessed by an application.
As explained in Section 3, Java Card comes with a hierarchical file system.
In our model, the current directory i1/.../in is coded by an array of short
[i1;...;in] that is stored in the path field of a file handler object fh im-
plementing the FileView interface. Moving to the in+1 directory is done by the
method call fh.select(in+1). Therefore, determining the accessed files requires
a precise analysis of the array content.
Consider the code of Fig. 6 that is representative of how files are accessed in
Java Card. Suppose that before calling the cd method, the field fh is either null
or points to an object ofh such that ∀i, ofh.path[i] = 0. At the method return,
with our base abstraction, the effect of the three paths is merged. We loose preci-
sion and get res = fh ∈ {null; ofh}∧ofh.path[0] ∈ [0; 1] ∧ ofh.path[1] ∈ [0; 20].
However, the precise post-condition of the cd method is P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3 where each





6 return fh; }
Figure 6: Typical code for accessing files
Pi models the effect of a particular execution path.
P1
△
= res = null ∧ fh = null ∧ ofh.path[0] = 0 ∧ ofh.path[1] = 0
P2
△
= res = null ∧ fh = ofh ∧ ofh.path[0] = 1 ∧ ofh.path[1] = 0
P3
△
= res = ofh ∧ fh = ofh ∧ ofh.path[0] = 1 ∧ ofh.path[1] = 20
Even for Java Card, the disjunctive completion [4] of our base abstract domain
does not scale. Trace partitioning [27] offers a configurable trade-off between
efficiency and precision. In particular, it allows a fine-grained control of when
abstract states should be merged or kept separate. Our trace partitioning strat-
egy is attaching to abstract states the trace of the encountered select calls.
A trace event is therefore of the form selecti where i identifies uniquely the
method call in the control-flow graph. At the end of the cd method, we obtain:
[] : P1 [select3] : P2 [select3; select5] : P3. The security guidelines mandate
that the applet install phase and the processing of a single command of the pro-
cess phase should terminate. We exploit this information and merge traces at
those specific events. This strategy is precise and terminating for all the Java
Card applications we have analysed.
6 Experimental evaluation
We have evaluated SawjaCard on 8 industrial Java Card applets. For confiden-
tiality reasons, we are required to keep them anonymous. The applications are
representative of basic applications. There are loyalty applets but also phone
applications. They require few privileges but access nonetheless certain non-
sensitive part of the file system. The characteristics of the applets can be found
in Fig. 7. For each applet, we provide the number of instructions of the appli-
cation and the number of instructions taking into account the libraries used by
Applet A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Instrs (app) 2769 2835 1823 1399 636 752 1245 230
Instrs (+ libs) 5824 5236 4301 5643 2834 3044 3402 2040
CFG 3435 6096 1491 1247 825 999 842 487
Time 29min 19min 6min 2min 32s 18s 4s 2s
Figure 7: Applet characteristics
the application. To give a finer estimate of the complexity of the code, we also
provide the number of nodes in the inlined control-flow graph constructed by
SawjaCard. However, this is still a coarse-grained measure of code complexity
which is weakly correlated with the analysis time. For instance, applet A1 exe-
cutes more instructions than applet A2, has fewer CFG nodes but takes longer
to analyse. The analysis time is obtained using a laptop with a Intel Core i7
processor and 8 GB of memory.
Fig. 8 summarises the analysis results for the 8 applets. We made a selection
of the properties that can be evaluated in a fully automatic way i.e., the result is
either boolean or can be expressed as a percentage of alarms. An entry in Fig. 8
reads as follows. A X denotes a fully verified property. A property is marked x if
it is a true violation according to our manual inspection of the code. A ? denotes
a false positive. A number denotes a percentage. For instance, 90 means that the
property holds for 90% of the program points relevant for the property – per-
centages are rounded from below. If it is in bold red, the remaining alarms are
true violation. Otherwise, we could not ascertain the absence of false positives.
For 75% of the properties, SawjaCard reports no alarm and thus those prop-
erties are automatically validated. We have investigated the remaining alarms
manually. For 12% of the properties, we have concluded that the alarms were all
genuine violations of the properties. Therefore, the verdict of SawjaCard is pre-
cise for 87% of the properties. For the remaining 13%, there are false positives.
For instance, we identified that certain ArrayOutOfBounds alarms were due to
a lack of precision of the analysis. However, on average, SawjaCard validates
nonetheless about 87% of array accesses. For the remaining alarms, there are
false positives but also real alarms. In the following, we explain in more details
a selection of the properties of Fig 8.
NullPointerException1 The precision of our null pointer analysis is satisfactory
as SawjaCard validates 98% of reference accesses. Moreover, for 4 of the ap-
plets, we could conclude after manual inspection that the remaining alarms
were real errors. For the other 4, the reasoning is more intricate and there
might still be false positives. A typical error we found consists in ignoring
that certain APIs can (according to the official specification) return a null
pointer in some unusual cases. For instance, the method getEntry of the class
uicc.toolkit.ToolkitRegistrySystem may return null if the server does not
exist or if the server returns null. None of the analysed application performs the
necessary defensive check to protect itself against such a null pointer.
ArrayOutOfBounds2 SawjaCard validates 87% of array accesses. The remaining
accesses are sometimes false positives. In particular, we have identified an ac-
cess whose verification would require a relational numeric analysis. However, a
1 From AFSCM rules: A basic application shall not include any code that leads to
NullPointerException, whatever this exception is caught or not.
2 From AFSCM rules: An application must not include any code that leads to Array-
OutOfBoundException, caught or not.
Alarms A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
NullPointerException 94 98 99 99 97 98 97 99
ArrayOutOfBounds 71 88 92 87 92 98 90 98
CatchIndividually 46 23 82 31 32 67 57 53
CatchNonISOException x x x x x x x x
HandlerAccess x X x x x X X X
AllocSingleton X X X X X x X X
SDOrGlobalRegPriv x X X X X X X X
SWValid ? X X X X X X X
ReplyBusy ? X X X X X X X
ClassCastException X X X X X X X X
NegativeArraySize X X X X X X X X
ArrayStoreException X X X X X X X X
SecurityException X X X X X X X X
AppletInStaticFields X X X X X X X X
ArrayConstantSize X X X X X X X X
InitMenuEntries X X X X X X X X
Figure 8: Analysis results – selected properties.
simple rewrite of the code would also resolve the problem. Other array accesses
rely on invariants that are not available to the analyser. For instance, certain
array indexes are read from files. More precisely, when reading a file, certain
applications first read a special segment, which is the file status. The full size of
the file is a field of this file status. As the content of the file cannot be known,
it is impossible to track this length.
CatchIndividually3 This rule corresponds to a strict coding discipline that is
almost syntactic: each type of exception should be caught by a different handler.
This property is responsible for numerous alarms. All the reported alarms cor-
respond to true violations of the rule. For instance, the following not compliant
code snippet catches all the different exceptions with a single handler.
1 try{buffer = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray((short)140,CLEAR_ON_RESET);}
2 catch (Exception e) {buffer = new byte[(short)140];}
CatchNonISOException4 All the applets trigger alarms for this property. The
alarms correspond to violations of the property. The exceptions that are ignored
correspond to exceptions that are not thrown by the application itself but escape
from library code. It might very well be that the proprietary implementations
3 From Global Platform rules: The Application should catch each exception defined
by the used APIs individually in the application code and should explicitly rethrow
the exception to the card runtime environment if needed.
4 From AFSCM rules: All exceptions thrown during the execution from any defined
entry point must be caught by the application, except ISOException that are thrown
in response to a command.
never raise these exceptions. Nonetheless, their possibility is reflected by our
model of the API which is based on the Java Card API specification.
Other properties. The AFSCM rules forbid the classic Java exceptions: Class-
CastException, NegativeArraySize and ArrayStoreException. For all the applets,
SawjaCard proves their absence. Thanks to our modelling of Java Card Firewall,
SawjaCard is also able to rule out SecurityExceptions. The rule AppletInStat-
icFields specifies that applet objects should not be stored in static fields. This
property is validated for all the applets. The next two rules concern values that
should be constant: array sizes and menu entries. Those rules are also vali-
dated for all the applets. The rule SDOrGlobalRegPriv is about privileges that
should be granted to access certain APIs. Applet 1 requires certain privileges
and therefore raises an alarm. The rules SWValid and ReplyBusy specify the
range of the status word return by applets. The rule is verified for all the applets
except applet 1. This is probably a false alarm given that the applet is using a
non-standard way of computing the status word. The last rule concerns certain
method calls returning handlers that should be protected by try-catch blocks.
SawjaCard raises an alarm for all the applets. This rule is indeed violated.
DeadCode5 For all the applets, SawjaCard detects some dead code which is due
to the Java compilation. Consider the following method which unconditionally
throws an exception. The return instruction is not reachable but is required by
the Java compiler.
1 void dead_code (short val){ SystemException.throwIt(1); return; }
The Java compiler also enforces that method should list the exceptions they
might raise using a throws clause. However, the algorithm for checking this clause
is purely syntactic. To make Java Card compile, a defensive approach consists
in adding handlers for all the potential exceptions. For certain calls, SawjaC-
ard proves that certain exceptions are never thrown and that the handlers are
therefore dead code. For compliance with the rule, a workaround would be to
remove the useless handlers and add to the throws clause of the method all the
exceptions that are proved impossible.
File handling 6 There is a significant number of properties concerning files.
Some of them are simple and do not lead to false positives (such as CreateFile,
CreateFilesAtInstall, FileResizing which only require to check arguments for
specific method calls). Other properties are more complex and require a precise
identification of the files that are read or written. Using trace partitioning (see
Section 5), we can precisely identify files paths that are constructed by a sequence
of select instructions with constant arguments. However, certain applets make
5 From AFSCM rules: dead code must be deleted/removed from the code.
6 From AFSCM rules: The file system provides access to files that are under the control
of the Mobile Network Operator. These files shall not be accessed by applications,
except for a few exceptions.
the assumption that the AID of a particular application is stored at a specific
position in a system file. The AIDs is thereafter used to access the root of the
sub file system owned by the application AID. Our model of the file system is too
coarse to encode this assumption and therefore we cannot handle this pattern.
Allocation7 The alarms are real violations. Most applets allocate objects af-
ter the install phase. Yet, more relaxed rules allow the allocation of singleton
objects. This rule is still violated by applet 6 which repeatedly tries to get a han-
dler. In our model of the library, each unsuccessful try allocates an intermediate
object and is therefore responsible for a memory leak. For the other applets, our
singleton domain is precise and ensures that memory allocation is finite.
7 Related work
For analysing Java programs, there are mature static analysis frameworks such
as Soot [32] and Wala [19]. Based on Wala, the Joana tool [13] is able to prove
security properties based on information-flow. Information-flow analyses would
probably benefit from the Java Card restrictions. Currently, AFSCM guidelines
do not consider such properties and are limited to safety properties.
Algorithms tuned for Java are usually not well-fitted for the constraints of
Java Card. In particular, state-of-the-art algorithms for constructing control-flow
graphs of Java programs are based on context-sensitive flow-insensitive points-
to analyses [22,29]. For Java Card, our analyser demonstrates that a context-
sensitive flow-sensitive points-to analysis is viable. It dynamically inlines meth-
ods calls and therefore literally computes an ∞-CFA. The Astree analyser is
using a similar strategy for handling function calls [5]. In their context, the
programs are large and function calls are rare. Java Card programs are compar-
atively tiny but method calls are ubiquitous.
For Java, Hubert et al., [16] show how to infer the best @NonNull annota-
tions for Fa¨hnrich and Leino type system [11]. The static analyser Julia [30,31]
implements a more costly but also more precise null pointer analysis that can
be efficiently implemented using BDDs. Because our objects are singletons, our
flow-sensitive points-to analysis performs strong updates and is therefore precise
enough to precisely track null pointers and rule out NullPointerExceptions.
Might and Shivers [23] show how to improve abstract counting of objects
using abstract garbage collection. Their analysis can prove that an abstract
object corresponds to a single live concrete object. Our singleton domain is
based on a different program logic and can ensure that an abstract object is
only allocated once. As Java Card usually does not provide garbage collection,
we really need to prove that there are only a finite number of allocated objects.
Semantics [28,9] and analyses [14,8] have been proposed for Java Card. Huis-
man et al., [18] propose a compositional approach to ensure the absence of
illicit applet interactions through Shareable interfaces. For basic applications
7 From Global Platform rules: A basic application should not perform instantiations
in places other than in install() or in the applet’s constructor.
such interactions are simply forbidden. Our tool verifies that applets do not ex-
pose Shareable interfaces and therefore enforces a simpler but stronger isolation
property. A version of the Key deductive verification framework [2] has been
successfully applied to Java Card [26]. JACK [3] is another deductive verifica-
tion tool dedicated to Java Card that is based on the specification language
JML [21]. However, deductive verification is applied at the source level and re-
quires annotations of the code with pre-(post-)conditions. This methodology is
not applicable in our validation context which needs to be fully automatic for
binary CAP files.
8 Conclusions
The validation process for smart card applications written in Java Card involves
around 55 rules that restrict the behaviour of the applications. This process can
benefit substantially from static analysis techniques, which can automate most
of the required verifications, and provide machine-assistance to the certifier for
the rest. The SawjaCard validation tool contains a static analysis which com-
bines analysis techniques for numeric and heap-based computations, and which
is further enhanced by specific domain constructions dedicated to the handling
of the file system and Java Card firewall. A substantial part of building such a
validation tool involves the modelling of libraries for which we propose to build
a series of stubs whose behaviour approximates the corresponding APIs suffi-
ciently well for the analysis to be accurate. Benchmarks on a series of industrial
application shows that the tool can analyse such applications in a reasonable
time and eliminate more than 80% of the required checks automatically.
The development of the tool suggests several avenues for further improve-
ments. The properties for which the tool could be improved are ArrayOutOf-
BoundException and file properties. The numeric analysis is only weakly rela-
tional, and it would be possible to increase its precision by using a full-blown
relational domains such as polyhedra or octagons. An effective alternative to
significantly reduce the number of alarms would be to impose stricter coding
rules (for example defensive checks for narrowing down the range of non con-
stant indexes). Our model of the file system could also be improved. To get a
precise and scalable analysis, our assessment is that file system specific abstract
domains should be designed. Certain properties are also simply not provable
because they depend on invariants that are established by the personalisation
phase of the application. This phase happens after the install phase and corre-
sponds to commands issued, in a secure environment, by the card manufacturer.
Currently, the end of this phase has no standard specification and cannot be
inferred from the applet code. For the others properties we have satisfactory
results: when the tool emits an alarm, it corresponds to a real error in the appli-
cation. The tool has been recently transferred to industry where it will be used
as part of the validation process.
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